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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

No. 10284
IN RE:

GREEN RIVER ADJUDICATION

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
DAGGETT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT

OPINION BELOW

The district court did not write an opinion.
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the district court was invoked by
the Attorney General of the State of Utah under
Chapter 4, Title 73, Utah Code ( 1953), to determine the rights to the use of all water, surface and
underground, within the drainage area involved in
(1)
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this case. Jurisdiction over the United States was
invoked under 43 U.S.C. sec. 666, and service was
made upon the Executive Assistant to the Attorney
General of the United States. Jurisdiction of this
Court rests on Title 78-2-2, Utah Judicial Code,
and on Rule 72 (a) , of this Court.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the United States must conform to

the requirements of the law of the State of Utah to reserve such water rights as are necessary for the
utilization of reserved public land for the purposes
for which the reservations were made.
2. Whether a water right acquired by the United
States may be subjected to exclusive use by third
parties on the basis that they hold revocable permits to graze on the public domain under the Taylor
Grazing Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is an appeal from the final decree of the
district court adjudicating all of the rights to the
use of water, surface and subsurface, within the
drainage area involved. The United States was
made a party pursuant to 43 U.S.C. sec. 666.
In its response before the State Engineer, the
United States asserted some 715 water users' claims
concerning uses of the waters involved by the Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Rec-
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lamation, both of the Department of the Interior,
and the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture. These claims encompassed rights acquired
by appropriation under the laws of the State of
Utah and, in addition, rights which are peculiarly
federal in nature. Thus, the Government stated:
As to the 715 claims submitted herewith, as
well as future claims of the United States arising within the area of adjudication, the United
States bases its claims upon appropriations
made under Utah law and also upon such
other rights under Utah law as may be valid;
in addition, the United States bases such claims
on its treaty-making powers, its requirements
for flood control and navigation, its control of
public and reserved lands, and any other applicable rights and powers under the Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress, including, but not limited to, Section 24
of the Act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat. 1103)
and the Act of June 4, 1897 ( 30 Stat. 35-36),
under the authority of which Acts there have
been set aside from public lands ceded to the
United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, 1848 (9 Stat. 922) certain forest reserves on which are situated the presently asserted uses of the Forest Service.
In addition to the specific claims filed herewith the United States also specifically claims
all rights to use the waters of the Green River
and its tributaries within the area of this adjudication proceeding that it may have by rea-
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son of the withdrawal of public lands within
that area and the reservation thereof for Federal purposes, without regard to whether or
not such waters may have heretofore been put
to use upon the said reserved lands. With regard to the 715 specific claims filed herewith
the United States does not waive, but on the
contrary hereby asserts, any and all priorities
to which it may be entitled either by reservation of lands from the public domain or by
appropriation under local laws and/or customs.
The claims based on reservations of public lands
filed on behalf of the Department of Agriculture
were all within the confines of the Ashley and
Wassatch National Forests. The reservation of land
for these forests dates back to the Presidential
Proclamation of February 22, 1897 (29 Stat. 895),
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. sec. 471. See Executive Order No. 884 of July 1, 1908; Presidential Proclamations of October 7, 1910 (36 Stat. 2750); June
3, 1915 (39 Stat. 1732) ; May 3, 1926 ( 44 Stat.
2611); April 2, 1930 (46 Stat. 3017); January 31,
1933 (47 Stat. 2552); and February 18, 1933 (47
Stat. 2555) .
The proposed determination of the State Engineer gave no recognition to the water rights asserted by virtue of federal withdrawals of public land.
In June 1962, objections were filed by the United
States to certain specific determinations and to the
failure to recognize the reserved rights as follows:
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8. The United States further objects to the
proposed determination of water rights filed
by the State Engineer of the State of Utah on
the ground that such proposed determination
does not recognize or make provision for rights
of the United States to use the waters of the
Green River and its tributaries within the area
of this adjudication proceeding that it may
have by reason of the withdrawal of public
lands within that area and the reservation
thereof for Federal purposes, without regard
to whether or not such waters may have heretofore been put to use upon the said reserved
land.
On September 16, 1963, hearings were held by
the district court on these and other objections
which had been filed by interested parties to the
proposed determination. The district court, at the
opening of these hearings, denied the Government's
claims to reserved rights, stating (Tr. 3):
THE COURT: There were certain matters
at pretrial here left to be determined. Is the
United States Government here represented?
Well, its claim to deal with water on its own
preserves without complying with the state
laws of Utah is denied. If the government is
engaged in proprietary ventures, it must comply with the laws of the state so far as I am
concerned. Other courts may hold differently,
but I won't so that issue is out. We don't need
to bother about that.
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The United States also asserted rights to use
water under Water Users' Claims Nos. 265, 2716,
2718 and 2719. Lee S. and Miranda Nebeker hold
revocable grazing permits from the United States
over the land issued by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C.
sec. 315. In addition, the N ebekers asserted rights
to the use of water based on certificates of appropriation issued by the State Engineer's Office. The
water users' rights claimed by the United States,
however, preceded the rights claimed by the Nebekers.
The district court confirmed the proposed determination of the State Engineer in most respects
in its decree entered June 13, 1964. That decree,
in keeping with the district court's views expressed
at the trial (supra, p. 5), rejected the claim of
reserved rights asserted by the United States and
stated:
17. That all other protests to said determination, both oral and written that are before
the court on this matter, are hereby dismissed.
With respect to the conflict between the claims of
the United States in Water Users' Claims Nos. 265,
2716, 2718 and 2719, and those of the N ebekers,
the court held:
14. The rights to the use of water under
Water User's Claims Nos. 265, 2716, 2718 and
2719 are affirmed in the name of the United
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States of America as owner thereof subject to
the right of Lee S. Nebeker and Miranda Nebeker to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the
right for stockwatering purposes so long as
they are holders of grazing permits on the public lands where the use is made. Except as
herein provided for the protest of Lee S. and
Miranda Nebeker is dismissed.
This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT
I

The United States Need Not Comply With the
Laws of the State of Utah to Reserve Water by
Withdrawal of Lands From the Federal Public
Domain for a National Forest

The district court clearly erred in denying the
claims of the United States to the use of water on
withdrawn public land sufficient for the requirements of the National Forest reservation. As the
Supreme Court said in Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908), "The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
appropriation under the state laws is not denied,
and could not be." Winters held that the reservation of water sufficient to meet the future requirements of an Indian reservation was implied from
the agreement establishing the Indian reservation.
This principle extends to federal withdrawal of
pubHe land for other purposes as well. Very re-
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cently, the Supreme Court has specifically so held
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963):
The Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to
other federal establishments such as National
Recreation Areas and National Forests. We
agree with the conclusions of the Master that
the United States intended to reserve water
sufficient for the future requirements of the
Lake Mead Na ti on al Recreation Area, the
Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the
Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the
Gila National Forest.
Indeed, the specific waters on the Ashley National ·
Forest have been so reserved. Glenn v. United
States (Civil No. C-153-61, D. Utah), decided
March 16, 1963 (a certified copy of the findings of
fact and conclusions of law were previously filed in
this case).
To the extent that waters within the National
Forests are needed for the fulfillment of the purposes of the reservation, they are not subject to appropriation subsequent to the withdrawal date,
1897. This does not preclude the use of these waters
by others, so long as they are not needed for the
reservation. The orderly way to administer such
usage would be through the appropriative laws of
the State of Utah. However, rights acquired thereunder would be vested only as against subsequent
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appropriation by private parties and would remain
subject to the right of the United States to use the
water, if and when needed for the reservation.
16 U.S.C. sec. 481 confirms this view. That section provides:
All waters within the boundaries of national
forests may be used for domestic, mining,
milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws
of the State wherein such national forests are
situated, or under the laws of the United
States and the rules and regulations established
thereunder.
It is to be noted that this statute is permissive in

nature. Thus, it provides that the waters "may be
used" but does not purport to make a permanent
disposition. In this connection, the permission or
privilege is much like a grazing permit issued pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. sec. 315,
which, as we discuss under Point II, infra, creates
no vested right against the United States but is a
right protected against third parties. Osborne v.
United States, 145 F.2d 892 (C.A. 9, 1944).
The district court's ruling was, thus, plain error.
This error could be cured without resort to an entirely new trial by merely inserting a clause in the
decree recognizing the reserved rights of the United
States in and to these waters and making all subsequent appropriative rights subject to the reserved
rights. This would leave establishment of the extent
of the reserved rights to future determination. This
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is desirable because the federal reserved rights may
expand if the Government's needs increase, even
though those needs may be adequately satisfied now.
II

The Established Prior Right of the United States
to Water May Not Be Subjected to Exclusive Use
of the Water by the Holder of a Taylor Grazing
Act Permit

The district court's subjection of the United
States' established prior water rights (Water Users'
Claims Nos. 265, 2716, 2718 and 2719 to the Nebekers' e~clusive use, while they hold grazing permits, is an invasion of federal power to administer
the federal range. A permit issued pursuant to the
Taylor Grazing Act does not carry with it any
right against the United States to use water. As a
matter of fact, such a permit carries no rights of
any nature against the United States and the Act
specifically so provides ( 43 U.S.C. sec. 315b):
So far as consistent with the purposes and
provisions of this Act, grazing privileges rec·
ognized and acknowledged shall be adequately
safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to
the provisions of this Act shall not create any
right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.
This has been fully confirmed by the courts. United
States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (C.A. 10, 1951), cert.
den., 342 U.S. 867; Osborne v. United States, 145
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F.2d 892 (C.A. 9, 1944); LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d

428 (C.A. D.C. 1963), cert. den., 376 U.S. 907.
The Secretary of the Interior has the duty and
the responsibility to manage the federal range created by the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. sec. 315.
As set forth in the portion of the statute quoted
above, recognized and acknowledged grazing privileges will be adhered to, so far as consistent with
the Act. This will also pertain to use of water on
the federal range, whether the United States' right
to the water be based on an appropriation under
state law or upon the reservation at the time of the
withdrawal. But, as we have shown in Point I,
supra, such private water use is permissive and not
mandatory and must always be subject to the federal interest in the management and operation of
property of the United States.
As stated in the Taylor Grazing Act, the primary
purpose is "to promote the highest use of the public
lands" ( 43 U.S.C. sec. 315) and, to accomplish this
purpose, the Secretary of the Interior has issued
regulations governing the use of the land and water
of the federal range. 43 C.F.R. 4110 (The Federal
Range Code). Under these regulations, it has frequently been necessary to apportion the water and
land of the United States among permittees, in
order to make certain that both land and water are
advantageously used. See Interior Grazing Decisions ( 1936-1938), e.g., pp. 44, 50, 125, 129, 168,
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180, 190. The district court has limited the right
of the Secretary of the Interior to manage the range
by "vesting" in the Nebekers the exclusive right to
the water in question, so long as they are permit.
tees. While it is true that the Secretary could cancel the permits and thus vitiate the "right," there
is no justification for leaving him only this extreme
method of managing and, if need be, apportioning
the use of the water in question among permittees.
This error could be solved merely by inclusion of
a provision that the Nebekers' rights are subject to
all authority of the Secretary of the Interior under
the Taylor Grazing Act.
CONCLUSION

The judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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